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INTRODUCTION
Corporations are well aware that "the primary source of delays and
cost in civil litigation" is discovery.' Discovery accounts for about 50%
of all litigation costs and up to 90% of the costs in the top 5% of the
most expensive cases.2 With the advent and rapid growth of electronic
document discovery, the corporate expense attributable to discovery
costs has risen dramatically. Reports of complex civil cases in which
document counts number in the tens of millions are more than litigation
lore; they are now part of the expensive reality confronting corporate
litigants. One estimate suggests that a complex suit between corporate
adversaries can result in the discovery of more than one hundred million
pages of documents.' In one case, a defendant spent more than three mil-
lion dollars complying with a discovery request.4 In another, a corporate
defendant in an antitrust class action bore the cost of producing over 30
million pages of email.5 Given the staggering volume of production in
such cases, corporations already facing tremendous discovery burdens in
a paper-based world now even face more extensive and expensive abuse.6
1. Milo Geyelin, Delaware Proposes Business Court To Speed Resolution of Disputes,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1993, at B3.
2. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Prac-
tice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 547-48 (1998).
3. Robert D. Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-Discovery Seas,
10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, 121 (2004), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vlOi5/
article53.pdf.
4. Corinne L. Giacobbe, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding
Who Should Bear the Costs of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 258
(2000).
5. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 360526, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995). The court found that the cost of produc-
tion was a foreseeable risk of choosing a particular electronic storage method:
On the one hand, it seems unfair to force a party to bear the lofty expense attendant
to creating a special computer program for extracting data responsive to a discovery
request. On the other hand, if a party chooses an electronic storage method, the ne-
cessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk ....
The normal and reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable by the
discovering party should be the ordinary and foreseeable burden of a respondent in
the absence of a showing of extraordinary hardship .... Class Plaintiffs should not
be forced to bear a burden caused by CIBA's choice of electronic storage.
Id. at 2.
6. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J.
561, 566 (2001). Id. at 589 ("As a result of these differences, one is able to predict that the
costs and burdens that electronic discovery imposes are likely to be substantially greater than
the costs and burdens imposed by traditional discovery."); Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for
Federal Standards Regarding Electronic Discovery, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 206 (2001) (not-
ing that "the discovery of electronic records" should be treated "differently from traditional
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As a result of increasing litigation costs, corporations are often forced
into a Hobson's choice: either they incur the expense of litigating their
cases all the way to a verdict,7 or they settle for an amount that does not
approximate the value of their legal entitlements in order to avoid the
expense of discovery. The Supreme Court has explicitly noted that dis-
covery expenses may push defendants to settle cases not on the merits,
but to avoid costly discovery.9 This is especially true for corporations, for
which initiating litigation can be a strategic decision, the goal of which
is often to use the threat of costly discovery to extract some level of
value from settlement, rather than to go to trial. In situations such as
these, the party imposing the costs on its opponent receives a settlement
premium (or discount) that is unrelated to the legal strength of its posi-
tion.10 Instead, this gain or loss represents the cost of avoiding lengthy
discovery involving voluminous document productions and time-
consuming reviews.
Even if we accept that the brinksmanship associated with discovery
is inescapable, we are left with another, more practical problem. While
corporate managers must assume that the risks associated with trial in-
crease with their document production obligations," current discovery
rules provide a poor check against the peculiar excesses of discovery in
general, and e-discovery in particular. It is widely recognized that the
rules of civil procedure "provide strong incentives" for parties to abuse
documents" as it is "an area of the law that is both unpredictable and increasingly subject to
abuse'").
7. For examples of how expensive discovery costs can be, see Geoff Howard & An-
drew Tran, Electronic Discovery Cost Containment Under the New Federal Rules and Beyond,
in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND RETENTION GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2006, at
371, 375 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 9006, 2006) ("Compa-
nies spent almost $4.6 billion on electronic information in 2005. $1.3 billion of that focused
on electronic discovery and that figure is expected to more than double by 2007."); Willging,
supra note 2 at 548 ("Among attorneys reporting any discovery expenses, the proportion of
litigation expenses attributable to discovery is typically fairly close to 50% ... Half estimated
that discovery accounted for 25% to 70% of litigation expenses. Both the mean and the me-
dian were about 50%... ).
8. Stephen J. Snyder & Abigail E. Crouse, Applying Rule I in the Information Age, 4
SEDONA CONF. J. 165, 168 (2003) ("Some companies argue that electronic discovery is poten-
tially so expensive that the costs of production may outstrip the value of even large cases such
that the defendants would be forced to settle rather than litigate.").
9. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 559 (2007) ("[T]he threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those
proceedings.").
10. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1989)
("The party in a position to threaten exhaustive discovery can claim for itself in settlement a
portion of the costs that should not have been imposed in the first place.").
11. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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discovery.' 2 The rules permit parties to seek a broad range of informa-
tion.'3 "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." 4 In the event that the
court deems the request to be one that imposes an "undue burden or ex-
pense," it has discretion to shift discovery costs.'5 However, in practice,
this discretion has failed to reduce discovery costs.6 Under the current
rules, in which the party responding to a discovery request bears the cost
of compliance, corporate litigants are subjected to potentially frivolous
and overly broad requests by opportunistic opponents because the party
requesting discovery is able to externalize the cost of compliance.' 7 Such
opponents may then extract settlement values that exceed the expected
value of a judgment in their favor. Conversely, responding parties are
able to retaliate by producing large quantities of data, a significant por-
tion of which may be irrelevant or produced with the intent to force
requesting parties into an early settlement. The cost of a delayed and
burdensome adjudication is often too much for the responding party to
bear. Outmoded and inconsistently applied,' 9 discovery rules impede not
only judicial decision-making but also managers' ability to make rational
12. E.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules,
84 GEO. L.J. 61, 65 (1995) [hereinafter Cooter & Rubinfeld, Reforming].
13. Brownstone, supra note 3, 7.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
15. Id. 26(c).
16. See discussion infra Part II.A.
17. Cooter & Rubinfeld, Reforming, supra note 12, at 65; see also Oppenheimer Fund,
Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
18. The discovery dilemma is not unique to disputes between corporate adversaries.
Congress recognized that many companies were unfairly burdened by discovery initiated
during frivolous securities fraud actions. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995) ("The
House and Senate heard testimony that discovery in securities class actions often resembles a
fishing expedition. As one witness noted, 'once the suit is filed, the plaintiff's law firm pro-
ceeds to search through all of the company's documents and take endless depositions for the
slightest positive comment which they can claim induced the plaintiff to invest and any shred
of evidence that the company knew a downturn was coming.'" (quoting testimony of Richard
J. Egan, Chairman of EMC Corp.)). Consequently, Congress in 1995 adopted the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), which was intended to reduce the number of
frivolous securities fraud actions by raising pleading standards. Additionally, some proponents
of the so-called "English Rule," under which litigation costs are shifted to the losing party,
also argue that an ex-post system of cost sharing will alter the choices of the parties so as to
reduce litigation abuses. See Snyder & Crouse, supra note 8, at 170. Nevertheless, high-stakes
litigation between corporations is different than the private securities litigation context where
there are obvious asymmetries between the plaintiff and defendant that would preclude many
meritorious lawsuits if the plaintiffs were forced to internalize the costs. In corporate on cor-
porate litigation, both parties are typically sizable entities with ready access to capital to
finance the costs of litigation. In this scenario, symmetrically situated opponents are best in-
fluenced by an ex-ante change to electronic discovery cost allocation.
19. See discussion infra Part II analyzing problems with e-discovery cost shifting cases
and rules.
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cost-benefit determinations regarding the course of litigation. By adopt-
ing an innovative approach to the discovery dilemma, this Article
provides a more responsive alternative.
Applying a game-theoretic approach based on the classic prisoners'
dilemma provides valuable insights into corporate managers' decision-
making incentives under existing discovery rules.' It demonstrates that
the fee structure imposed by current discovery rules leads to inefficiency
and motivates corporate litigants on either side of a controversy to em-
ploy abusive discovery practices, although each party would benefit from
cooperation. Using this framework, this Article shows how a cost-
sharing regime can motivate litigants to engage in cooperative discovery
and, as a consequence, facilitate more efficient and less abusive discov-
ery practices. To date, scholars, who have posited that cooperative
behavior in the discovery process will ultimately reduce abuse and con-
comitantly lower costs, have proposed such solutions as completely
shifting the cost from the responding party to the requesting party.22 This
will not resolve the problem.2 ' Accordingly, this Article argues that a de-
fault-rule of equal cost-sharing would realign the strategic incentives of
corporate litigants to encourage cooperation as opposed to abuse in dis-
covery. Although the parties currently have the ability to contract around
the responder-pay-all default, research has shown that a party who sug-
gests a departure from a default rule is negatively perceived by her
opponent.' However, a 50/50 cost-sharing rule changes the default and
allows corporate parties to more effectively bargain because their start-
ing positions are better aligned with their incentives. Evenly dividing the
20. For more on how the Prisoners' Dilemma illustrates patterns of cooperation and
conflict see, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION passim (1984) (dis-
cussing the logical outcomes of a repeated play Prisoners' Dilemma game).
21. Redish, supra note 6, at 569 ("Because litigants do not bear the costs created by
their discovery requests, their incentive to confine those requests in a procedurally efficient
manner is significantly distorted. The inescapable result is substantial waste and inefficiency
in the conduct of discovery.").
22. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, Reforming, supra note 12, (proposing a two-part cost-
shifting rule); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discov-
ery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1994) (considering cost-shifting policy recommendations to
reduce discovery abuse) [hereinafter Cooter & Rubinfeld, Economic Model]; Redish, supra
note 6 (proposing for a conditional cost-shifting model for electronic discoveries).
23. A solution such as complete cost-shifting changes the type of abuse as opposed to
reducing it. Instead of requesting parties abusing responding parties through abusive requests,
responding parties now have incentives to abuse in the process of complying. For example, the
responding party no longer has an incentive to use the most cost effective means of collecting,
reviewing, and producing documents as all of her costs are now externalized. For more on the
problems associated with cost-shifting approaches, see, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Discovery
Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465 passim (1994).
24. See discussion on status-quo bias infra Part H.C.
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cost of document discovery alters the underlying assumptions of the de-
cision-making process and makes mutual cooperation the only
economically advantageous alternative. Tying the cost borne by a re-
questing party to the cost incurred by the responding party creates, in the
language of game theory, a dominant strategy of cooperation. Conse-
quently, it would reduce exposure to uncapped litigation costs,
discourage useless discovery requests, reduce overly broad or inappro-
priately narrow discovery responses, and avoid potential sanctions that
may be imposed on corporate litigants for discovery misconduct.
The cost and uncertainty that result from increasingly expensive dis-
covery demand a reexamination of the incentives underlying the current
rules and the impact on corporate litigants. Part I of this Article considers
how document discovery has changed litigation practice. It briefly fo-
cuses on the initial change in traditional "paper document" discovery
with the evolution of the photocopier and then turns to the electronic
discovery revolution. Discovery, even in its paper-based form, has al-
ways been prone to excess and abuse. 2 However, advances in
information storage have magnified the incentives and opportunities for
abuse that flow from a cost-allocation structure that allows parties to ex-
ternalize discovery costs. Specifically, Part I identifies how modern
discovery provides the means by which adversaries may impose expen-
sive and burdensome requests or responses on their opponents,
leveraging these tactics to induce premature and misvalued settlements.
Part II briefly discusses attempts to ameliorate the discovery dilemma
such as the December 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP"). As amended, FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) 26 enumerates the
factors that courts must weigh when deciding whether to use their dis-
cretion to shift discovery costs.2 This Article argues that FRCP
26(b)(2)(C) does not adequately address the cost of discovery or the
ways in which current incentives lead a rational actor to abuse the
discovery process. Part III proposes a novel cost-sharing legal regime,
based on the prisoners' dilemma, which would restructure litigant incen-
tives to encourage cost-lowering cooperation. The switch to a cost-
sharing default rule would reduce abusive discovery tactics and in turn
25. Scott Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot be Optimal but Could be Better: The Eco-
nomics of Improving Discovery liming in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 895 (2009)
(observing that "e-discovery is just a new instance of an old problem" and that technology
facilitates more discovery, increasing existing controversy costs).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C); See also JAMES WM. MOORE, I-V MOORE'S FEDERAL
RULES PAMPHLET § 26.5[2][b] (Matthew Bender 2007).
27. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), the court may shift the costs of discovery, in whole or
in part, to the requesting party. Id.
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would improve the ability of corporate managers to assess risks when
making litigation and settlement decisions.
I. CORPORATE COSTS: THE DISCOVERY DILEMMA
Corporations have long faced the problem of costly discovery.
Courts have also confronted the challenge of determining the boundaries
of proper requests and responses.2' This balancing of the parameters of
an appropriate request and the interests of the requesting and responding
parties is not a new challenge. However, recent technological advances,
specifically the development of electronically stored information
("ESI"), have exacerbated the problem. First, this section briefly ad-
dresses how improvements in technology, such as the photocopier, have
historically raised discovery concerns. The section then analyzes the
manner in which ESI has resulted in formerly inconceivable volumes of
documents 29 and exploding discovery costs. As the volume and corre-
sponding costs have increased, so has the potential for discovery abuse.
Thus, discovery has potentially become the most potent weapon in the
corporate litigant's arsenal.30
A. Pre-Electronic Discovery: Cost Explosion
The modern outcry over discovery costs and the corresponding de-
mands for change are not new. In the 1960s, the photocopier began to
supplant the mimeograph machine and revolutionize discovery in the
process. Rapid mass production of documents became less expensive
and simpler than at any time in the past. Consequently, the volume of
paper documents available for discovery multiplied." Multiple copies
of the same document became commonplace.32 Not surprisingly,
28. Todd D. Robichaud, Old Wine in New Bottles: Discovery Disputes and Cost-
Shifting in the Digital Age, THE BRIEF, Winter 2004 at 56.
29. John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REv.
505, 519 (2000).
30. Discovery has been often analogized to both a valuable tool and a powerful
weapon. See ALAN M. GAHTAN, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 10 (1999) ("The discovery of elec-
tronic evidence has become the modem litigator's newest tool (or some would say,
weapon).").
31. See Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Elec-
tronic Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 266 (2001).
32. Id. (Noting that, by the 1980s, it was thought that any document had at least ten to
twenty
copies).
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discovery costs rose exponentially,33 and discovery occupied a greater
portion of "the litigation timeline." The increase in volume and costs
was accompanied by a rise in discovery disputes.- Additionally, reform
proposals indicated that concerns over escalating discovery costs
prompted criticism and review of the discovery rules.36 An ABA Special
Committee was established for the "Study of Discovery Abuse."37 Both
the ABA Special Committee and a Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules proposed changes to the federal rules.3" Their
suggestions indicated that the two committees were "interested primarily
in curbing the cost of discovery and reducing the ways discovery [could]
be abused for purposes of harassment and delay."39
The 1960s and early 1970s saw technological changes that led to an
increase in discovery volume, burden, and costs, and has since "been
characterized by some as a 'litigation explosion.' ,4 The widespread use
of computers and digital communication has spawned a similar escala-
tion. It should therefore come as no surprise that electronic document
discovery, especially in high-stakes corporate litigation, comprises the
bulk of any discovery conducted by the litigants.'
33. Microsoft Corporation Comments on the E-Discovery Rules Change Proposals, E-
mail from Greg McCurdy, Senior Attorney, Microsoft Corporation, to Peter McCabe,
Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Aug. 25, 2004, 04:33 p.m.) (first
page of a 26-page attachment, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/04-CV-
001 .pdf).
34. DAVID SPENCER & MICHAEL C. BROGAN, MEDIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 26
(2006).
35. Id.
36. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1332 (1978).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. SPENCER & BROGAN, supra note 34, at 26.
41. Cf Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REv. 1961, 2010 (2007) ("For example, if, as the data suggests, the most serious
discovery problems are in high stakes, complex cases, one might consider adjusting the rules
according to the number of parties and claims or the amount of the damages at stake, all of
which are reasonably clear criteria that could be applied relatively easily."); Linda S.
Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REv. 683, 685-86
(1998) ("[T]he studies reaffirm common sense notions about discovery: that complex, high
stakes litigation, handled by big firms with corporate clients, are the cases most likely to in-
volve the kind of problematic discovery that skews the discovery debate. As the FJC
concludes: 'Both the likelihood of problems and the total incidence of problems increased as
stakes, factual complexity, and contentiousness increased.'"); Willging et. al., supra note 2, at
574 ("Document production problems were far more likely to be reported by attorneys whose
cases involved high stakes, but even in low-to-medium stakes cases ($4000 to $500,000), 36%
of the attorneys reported problems with document production. In medium-to-high stakes cases
($500,000 to $2 million), 56% of attorneys reported such problems .... ").
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B. Electronic Discovery: More Information, More
Costs, More Problems
The evolution and proliferation of electronic communication tools
and data storage has expanded the scope of discovery and increased the
potential for discovery abuse by significantly increasing the costs, both
monetary and non-monetary, associated with discovery." Estimates sug-
gest that over 90% of corporate communications and documents are
stored electronically.43 Additionally, the volume of information that can
be retained has risen drastically.
The intrinsic characteristics of information created and maintained
in electronic form have had a transformative effect on the nature of dis-
covery practice. All corporations will "almost certainly" have to respond
to an electronic discovery request, which "can be an incredibly costly
problem."" ESI is exponentially more voluminous than its paper prede-
cessor.45 Storage was once limited to the amount of paper a person could
hold in a particular physical space. Now, a hard drive or magnetic com-
puter tape may store the equivalent of millions of printed pages, while
occupying just a few square inches of space." Improvements in informa-
tion storage technologies (such as CD-ROMs, DVDs, flash memory
drives, increased hard drive capacities, etc.)47 increase the volumes of
42. Mia Mazza, Emmalena K. Quesada & Ashley L. Sternberg, In Pursuit of FRCP 1:
Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored
Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 3 (2007) (noting that "[it is an accepted fact that
'the discovery of computer-based information [can] cost more, take more time and create
more headaches than conventional paper based discovery.' ") (citation omitted).
43. Harvey L. Kaplan, Electronic Media Discovery in the 21st Century, in ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY AND RETENTION GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2005, at 65, 67 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 6634, 2005); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE
WORKING GROUP, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCI-
PLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 2 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al.
eds., 2nd ed. 2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_
PRINCP_2nd ed_607.pdf [hereinafter THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES]; Snyder & Crouse, supra
note 8, at 167 ("Studies have estimated that more than 90% of all information generated in the
business world is electronic and as much as 30% of that information may never be converted
into paper form.").
44. Melanie Rodier, E-Discovery: A Daunting Task - As Electronic Data Proliferates,
Complying with E-Discovery Rules Becomes More Difficult and More Costly, WALL ST. &
TECH., Sept. 1, 2007, at 23.
45. See Byers v. Ill. State Police, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 740, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL
1264004, at *31-32 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002); see also Barbara J. Rothstein, Ronald J. Hedges
& Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Managing Discovery of Electronic Information: A Pocket Guide for
Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 2 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/eldscpkt.pdf
("The volume of ESI is almost always exponentially greater than paper information, and it
may be located in multiple places.").
46. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 2.
47. Rothstein et al., supra note 45, at 2.
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retained data and simultaneously decrease the physical space occupied
by such storage. "The sheer volume of [electronic] data, when compared
with conventional paper documentation, can be staggering."'8 Hence,
physical space is no longer a meaningful limitation on document storage
since electronic storage has become the ubiquitous means of maintaining
the massive volumes of newly-created information."
Additionally, ESI has zombie-like qualities. Although one may be-
lieve it to be destroyed, it invariably rises from its grave. Replication and
subsequent storage of electronic documents are often automated proc-
esses, occurring without the end-user's knowledge." Consequently, when
an end-user creates, alters, or deletes an electronic document, multiple
additional forms of data are automatically generated as a byproduct.5 '
ESI is comprised of many other types of data which include metadata,
system data, residual data,52 and possibly shadowed copies of deleted
files.53 Metadata (information about the document) includes "the file
creation date, when it was last accessed or edited, by whom, and some-
times previous versions or editorial changes."5 For example, email
metadata may reveal "such information as the dates the mail was sent,
received, replied to or forwarded, blind carbon copy ('bcc') information,
and sender address book information."55 System data includes higher
48. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
A floppy disk, with 1.44 megabytes, is the equivalent of 720 typewritten pages of
plain text. A CD-ROM, with 650 megabytes, can hold up to 325,000 typewritten
pages. One gigabyte is the equivalent of 500,000 typewritten pages. Large corporate
computer networks create backup data measured in terabytes, or 1,000,000 mega-
bytes; each terabyte represents the equivalent of 500 billion typewritten pages of
plain text.
Id.
49. See Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, Sch. of Info. Mgmt. and Sys., Univ. of Cal. at
Berkeley, How Much Information? 2003 (2003), http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/
projects/how-much-info-2003, at 9 ("Information stored on paper, film, optical, and magnetic
media totals about 5 exabytes of new information each year .... ").
50. THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 2 ("[O]ther business applications are
designed to periodically and automatically make copies of data. Examples of these include
web pages that are automatically saved as cache files and file data that is routinely backed up
to protect against inadvertent deletion or system failure.").
51. Id. at 2-3; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
52. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004) ("Residual data
that exist in bits and pieces throughout a computer hard drive. Analogous to the data on crum-
pled newspapers used to pack shipping boxes, these data are also recoverable with expert
intervention.") (emphasis omitted).
53. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the various forms of additional data, see THE
SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 43; see also Giacobbe, supra note 4; Redish, supra note 6.
54. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
55. THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 3; Discovery of metadata can lead to
more discovery requests of the underlying physical documents, because the requesting party
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level information, such as records of routine transactions like printing,
deleting, or creating files. Another form of data that many corporations
automatically generate for the purpose of disaster recovery is backup
data.16 Backup data is often stored off-line on magnetic tapes and is not
designed to be utilized in the ordinary course of business." If a company
needs to access this data, such as in the event of an emergency, the data
would have to be restored to the same network by which it was gener-
ated, usually in a time-intensive and expensive process."
1. Producing Electronic Information
The production of ESI raises distinct challenges for corporations and
results in unique costs. 9 Other than volume, 6° typical problems are locat-
ing ESI, the scope of discovery (including issues of deleted files and
backup data), the form of production, the need for technical expertise,
and screening for relevance and privilege.6' For a larger corporation, the
challenge of identifying target locations and persons and then searching
each location and person for responsive information can be far more
time-consuming and expensive than it was in a conventional paper-based
system. An ambitious party that seeks to burden her opponent may easily
request that documents be produced from all potential locations and per-
sons. Conversely, a less than cooperative respondent may argue that
searching particular locations imposes an undue burden or expense 62 and
force the rapid and costly volley of motions to shift costs, compel dis-
covery, or issue protective orders. Alternatively, the respondent may
make an overly broad response, inundating the other party with so much
data that a meaningful or comprehensive review is impossible.
In many corporations ESI resides in a wide range of places, many of
which are not obvious. Electronic files may be kept on many types of
media, such as floppy disks, computer hard drives, CD-ROMs, DVDs,
would be alerted to the existence of documents of which she would have otherwise been un-
aware.
56. Redish, supra note 6, at 585.
57. Id.
58. Giacobbe, supra note 4, at 264. See also Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229
F.R.D. 568, 572 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D.
309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Byers v. 111. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *10
(N.D. I11. June 3, 2002). Depending on how the electronic data is stored, it can be difficult, and
hence expensive, to retrieve the data and search it for relevant documents. Theoretically, as
technology improves, retrieving and searching data will become more standard and less costly.
See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery By Keyword Search, 15 No. 3 PRAC. LIT. 7 (2004).
59. MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE § 6.01, 6-3 (2004
ed.).
60. See discussion infra notes 45-57.
61. ARKFELD, supra note 59, at § 6.01, 6-3.
62. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
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flash cards, zip disks, memory sticks, thumb drives, and PC cards.63 ESI
can also be found on a vast number of devices including laptops, per-
sonal data assistants, network servers, cellular phones, 64 smart and
magnetic stripe cards, and printers.65 The -larger the entity, the greater the
number of storage locations. Documents can also be created in a proprie-
tary or obsolete application, making it difficult for the requesting party
to access the data.' Additionally, encryption and password protections
may present barriers that render the information useless to the receiving
party unless additional steps are taken. Providing access to proprietary or
outdated applications often raises significant issues related to trade se-
crets and other "sensitive information that is not directly relevant to the
controversy. ' 6 This concern reveals novel avenues of abuse for litigants
on either side of a dispute.
As a result of the array of choices available, many companies are
easily able to store large amounts of data without the constraint of physi-
cal space limitations.68 Additionally, individual employees are able to
remove, create, and store data on their computers, personal data assis-
tants, and other removable storage devices. 69 A document can instantly
be emailed to countless recipients anywhere in the world, meaning thou-
sands of individuals can receive a document in a matter of seconds.70
Along with the immeasurable storage options, this "rapid movement"
and broad dissemination of ESI is a major electronic discovery diffi-
culty.7' Because the information is easily moved from one person to the
next, parties must identify and attempt to agree upon the individuals
from whom documents may be discovered. 2 Likewise, identifying the
universe of documents that may contain discoverable information is a
63. ARKFELD, supra note 59, § 2.04, 2-17 to 2-25.
64. Cellular phones may have the capability to send and receive emails, text messages,
faxes, pictures, document files, and can contain call history, name and address books, as well
as recorded memos and even conversations. Id. at § 2.05, 2-35.
65. Id. at § 2.05, 2-25 to 2-52.
66. Ophir D. Finkelthal, Scope of Electronic Discovery and Methods of Production, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1591, 1631 (2005).
67. Id. at 1631-32.
68. Scott Sher & Daryl Teshima, e-Normous: The Increasing Burden Associated with
Electronic Document Production in Second Request Investigations, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE
(Nov. 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/05/11/NovO5-Sherll=
29.pdf ("Because the cost of electronic document storage has declined so dramatically in re-
cent years, companies tend to allow electronic data to reside on their underutilized storage
systems for a very long time [and] there is the equivalent of tens of thousands of boxes of
documents located in a company's electronic repositories.").
69. ARKFELD, supra note 59, at § 2.06, 2-54.
70. Id. at § 2.06, 2-53.
71. Id.
72. Finkelthal, supra note 66, at 1610-12.
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crucial aspect of cost and time management. The broader the scope of a
request, the more costly compliance will be.
Because the process of collecting and producing ESI involves so
many locations, formats, and individuals, it "is often a highly technical
process that can require special expertise, software, and computer infra-
structure that law firms typically do not possess. '73 If responding parties
fail to employ expert assistance, they risk making costly mistakes such
as damaging, losing, or omitting ESI.
Expert assistance is extremely expensive, with some experts charg-
ing $265 per hour.74 The necessity and success of expert assistance is
evidenced by an electronic production cottage industry that has quickly
grown and was expected to almost triple in size from $1.3 billion in
2005, to more than $3 billion in 2008.7' The growing obligation to obtain
expert assistance is one of the most obvious ways in which this new
world imposes costs on litigants.
2. Document Review
After the producing party gathers electronic documents from all
relevant sources, both parties must decide whether to review the docu-
ments in paper or electronic format.7 6 In complex, high-stakes litigation,
where large volumes of data are common, the cost of printing typicallyprecldes • 77
precludes paper review. The alternative, electronic review, can occur in
three ways: (1) viewing electronic files in their "native" format; (2) using
73. Gregory D. Shelton, Providing Competent Representation in the Digital Informa-
tion Age, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 261, 267 (2007); see also Henry S. Noyes, Is E-Discovery So
Different That It Requires New Discovery Rules? An Analysis of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 TENN. L. RFv. 585, 599 (2004) (discussing the need to
hire outside vendors to locate, gather, and translate electronic information); see also discus-
sion supra Part I.A.; see also Kenneth J. Withers, Is Digital Different? Electronic Disclosure
and Discovery in Civil Litigation, Dec. 30, 1999, available at http:/ www.kenwithers.com/
articles/bileta/index.htm, at pt. lII.C ("[M]ost lawyers and their clients are unfamiliar with the
workings of their own desktop computers, let alone a computer network.") [hereinafter With-
ers, Different].
74. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I1), 216 F.R.D. 280, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (noting that Pinkerton Consulting & Investigations charged their client $245 per hour
for restoration services as well as for "development, refinement and execution of a search
script").
75. Frank P. DeGiulio, Electronic Discovery: A Practicum for the Maritime Lawyer, 19
U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1. n.67 (2006-2007).
76. Michael M. Wechsler & Michele C.S. Lange, Today's Discovery Demands Require
Proficiency in Searching Electronic Documents, 76 N.Y. ST. B.A.J. 18, 20 (2004).
77. Paper review requires printing all of the electronic documents, and depending on
the scope of the request, it may include printing any relevant metadata for those documents.
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a local, searchable database; or (3) using an online document review re-
pository."
Although electronic documents offer time-saving review techniques,
these approaches can increase the risk of excluding a substantial number
of potentially relevant documents. 9 For example, in the case of keyword
searching, the chosen search terms control the identification of relevant
documents.80 Due to the error rate and possibility of sanctions associated
with incomplete keyword searching, the review process remains cumber-
some, costly, and subject to inadvertent disclosures even though an
initial keyword search can reduce the amount of data that the producing
party has to review for relevant and privileged information.
The review of electronic documents for relevance and privilege is
extremely expensive;8 it is often completed by attorneys at substantial
hourly rates. Inadvertent revelations of privileged information may result
in a waiver of any privilege claims over the disclosed information or,
even worse, waiver of the entire subject matter to which that information
reaches.82 Metadata further complicates the matter. Because some courts
have held that metadata must be produced, 3 the cost of producing ESI
continues to increase when the producing party must meticulously
search all electronic information and metadata for privileged information
before producing it to opposing counsel. Because the vast amounts of
data impose tremendous costs that preclude detailed review of each
document, the likelihood of revealing privileged information increases .
When document review costs approach the amount in controversy, a
party may be forced to settle an otherwise credible claim or defense to
avoid the expense.86 Thus, electronic discovery burdens must be allo-
cated differently, or the costs of discovery may prevent fair resolution of
high-stakes civil disputes.
78. Id.
79. Mazza et al., supra note 42, 21, 46.
80. Id.
81. The (2004) Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations and Principles for
Addressing Electronic Document Production, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 151, 154 (2004).
82. Lee H. Rosenthal, Privilege Review, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PT. 167, 167 (2006).
83. See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 652 (D. Kan.
2005).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's notes.
85. Rosenthal, supra note 82, at 167.
86. Leigh Jones, The Surging Evolution of E-Discovery, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 2004 at I
(remarking that Gelbmann Associates, a technology investment firm in Minnesota, estimated
that e-discovery preservation, production, and collection costs would come close to $700 mil-
lion in 2004 and approach $1.8 billion by 2006).
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II. RECENT REFORMS TO REDUCE COSTS HAVE FAILED
The current cost allocation structure in civil discovery, with the re-
questing party receiving the benefits and the responding party incurring
the costs, creates strong incentives for corporate litigants to abuse each
other. A system like the one adopted by the United States, in which dis-
covery costs are externalized, creates optimal conditions for abuse. Like
an unsupervised child in a candy store toting an unlimited credit card,
the requesting party may ask for whatever it likes as there is no incentive
to limit a request to one that is narrowly tailored to the party's legal enti-
tlements.87 In fact, the incentives flow in the opposite direction. It may be
almost costless88 for a requesting party to issue an overly broad and un-
duly burdensome request, which, in turn, can be highly beneficial to the
requesting party. Furthermore, in a state like Delaware where almost half
of the incorporated entities have 250 or more employees, the problem is
more pronounced because there are more individuals from whom a re-
questing party can seek documents. 9
The increased cost associated with ESI, as a result of its massive
volume and complexity, makes it a very powerful weapon. In the infor-
mation age, a party can impose tremendous costs on its adversary by
"cast[ing] their discovery nets wider to search for relevant information."'
Instead of seeking a relevant document that spans a few sheets of paper,
litigants may seek multiple copies of documents in various forms. After
all, archived data and metadata are discoverable and may contain informa-
tion relevant to the parties' legal claims or defenses. Contemporary
document discovery, which is primarily electronic, places a significant
burden on the responding party while simultaneously providing benefits to
87. For the requesting parties, receiving more documents than can be sifted through is
not a deterrent as there is no requirement that the requesting party review everything received.
The requesting party is able to sort and chose among the documents received in accordance to
their time and financial limitations.
88. Mazza et a]., supra note 42, 167 ("It costs almost nothing for a requesting party to
put together and issue an extremely broad, highly burdensome request for production of
documents. Even a 'small' requesting party can gain a significant strategic advantage by send-
ing out a boilerplate request, which then effectively puts the onus on the responding party to
either spend time and money preserving, collecting, processing, reviewing, and producing
enormous volumes of ESI early on in the case or spend time and money litigating discovery
disputes.").
89. MergentOnline Database, http://www.mergentonline.com (last visited Dec. 13,
2009) (providing current data on active companies).
90. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litiga-
tion: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 370-71 (2000) ("[B]ecause
computerized information tends to exist in duplicate form in various locations, litigants may
legitimately cast their discovery nets wider to search for relevant information.").
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the requesting party." For instance, it "enable[s] the requesting party to
more easily review, organize, and manage information " 9' Conversely, the
exponential increase in volume due to electronic creation and storage
combined with nascent data management systems can place tremendous
cost on the responding party as it locates and reviews data for relevance
and privilege before production.93
These production costs are potentially so severe that even in high-
value cases, many defendants may have no choice but to settle because
the cost of production is greater than the value of litigating the case.94
However, totally shifting the costs of discovery to the requesting party,
thereby making them responsible for the cost of the entire request, may
determine the outcome of the litigation based on the resources of the
requesting party instead of the merits of the case. "Litigants with limited
means [may be] effectively barred from discovering highly relevant in-
formation for use at trial."95 A solution where costs are borne by the
requesting party ameliorates the incentive distortions associated with
externalized costs for the requesting party; however, it replaces these
with new incentive distortions, where responding parties are able to ex-
ternalize their costs to the requesting party. As a result of these
misaligned incentives, responding parties would no longer have an in-
centive to minimize collection, review, and production costs as they
know that all of these costs are now borne by their opponent.96 Conse-
quently, sophisticated responders may increase the volume and
complexity of their production.
The proliferation of ESI has made the cost concerns associated with
discovery more pronounced. Just as the Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules examined the cost increases associated with
the photocopier, the December 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have attempted to address the emergent issues associated
91. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
92. Rothstein et al., supra note 45, at 4. Note, however, that many of these benefits can
be undermined by an overly inclusive response that provides hordes of unnecessary informa-
tion increasing the burden of sorting through the materials.
93. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
94. Snyder & Crouse, supra note 8, at 168.
95. Id. See also Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik
Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Effi-
cient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 91 (2005) ("Cost-shifting regimes
come in two varieties: one-way and two-way. Both are intended to promote efficiency by en-
couraging settlements and keeping inefficient cases out of court. However, previous research
indicates that one-way cost-shifting rules are less effective in promoting efficiency than two-
way rules because of their asymmetrical impact.").
96. See Cooper, supra note 23.
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with ESI.97 The amendments expand the role of judges in managing
some of the pitfalls of the discovery process.98 The amendments also en-
courage cooperation among the parties through more substantial meet-
and-confer obligations, which is consistent with the opinions of many
scholars and practitioners. 99 These changes do not adequately address the
incentive distortions endemic to discovery. This section will address the
manner in which two of these changes-the augmented role of judges
and explicit obligations to confer-fail to promote a less expensive and
more cooperative discovery process by maintaining the same problem-
atic incentive structure, in which the party receiving the benefit from
discovery externalizes her costs. The section continues with an analysis
of how discovery is an ideal candidate for a strategic realignment that
supplies incentives for cooperation among litigants, as opposed to abu-
sive adversarial tactics. It concludes by examining why corporations
97. Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TEcH. & INTELL. PROP. 171,
7 (2006).
98. Id.
99. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(f). The notes to the rule clearly indicate that electronic discovery
is unique and the meet-and-confer obligations contemplated by FED. R. Civ. P. 26() hope to
facilitate cooperative behavior among the parties, which in turn will reduce costs. Specifically,
the 2006 Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f), advisory committee notes state:
Subdivision (f). Rule 26(f) is amended to direct the parties to discuss discovery of
electronically stored information during their discovery-planning conference. The
rule focuses on "issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
information"; the discussion is not required in cases not involving electronic dis-
covery, and the amendment imposes no additional requirements in those cases.
When the parties do anticipate disclosure or discovery of electronically stored in-
formation, discussion at the outset may avoid later difficulties or ease their
resolution.
... In appropriate cases identification of, and early discovery from, individuals with
special knowledge of a party's computer systems may be helpful.
•.. Rule 26(f)(3) explicitly directs the parties to discuss the form or forms in which
electronically stored information might be produced. The parties may be able to
reach agreement on the forms of production, making discovery more efficient ....
Early discussion of the forms of production may facilitate the application of Rule
34(b) by allowing the parties to determine what forms of production will meet both
parties' needs. Early identification of disputes over the forms of production may
help avoid the expense and delay of searches or productions using inappropriate
forms.
Rule 26(f) is also amended to direct the parties to discuss any issues regarding pres-
ervation of discoverable information during their conference as they develop a
discovery plan .... The volume and dynamic nature of electronically stored infor-
mation may complicate preservation obligations .... Failure to address
preservation issues early in the litigation increases uncertainty and raises a risk of
disputes.
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have not chosen to contract around the current cost allocation rules, and
instead need an explicit change to a cost-sharing regime.
A. Increased Judicial Involvement Does Not Decrease Costs
Judges and lawmakers have recognized that traditional discovery
principles, such as the default rule that parties bear the cost of complying
with a discovery request, do not adequately resolve document production
disputes, particularly in light of ESI.
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The December 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules adopt solu-
tions that enable judges to perform a more active function in
addressing discovery issues. The solutions fall victim to the same
drawbacks that were present under the pre-amendment rules.'00 Al-
though some commentators have posited that these rules give judges
the discretion and tools to address discovery abuse,'0 ' significant dis-
100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26, 30, 33.
101. See Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86
B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1169-70 (2006).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give trial judges broad discretion to design
procedures for particular cases. For example, judges have considerable latitude to
shape party and claim structure, define the sequence and scope of discovery ....
The original Federal Rule drafters made a conscious choice to grant broad discre-
tion, based on the assumption that trial judges had the experience and expertise to
appropriately tailor procedures to the circumstances of individual cases.
Id.
See also John S. Beckerman, supra note 29, at 539; Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse
Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F.
L. REV. 189, 189-90 (1992).
The small mountain of literature on discovery abuse generated recently has tilted
strongly toward the managerial approach as the most likely solution to this persis-
tent problem. Similarly, Federal Rules 26 and 16 were amended in 1980 and 1983,
respectively, to encourage judges to become pervasively and actively involved in
case management early in litigation and to ride herd on discovery.
Id.
See also Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE
L.J. 1755, 1771 n.13 (1992).
Recognizing the problem of civil delay caused by abuse of discovery procedure, the
Judicial Conference passed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quiring pretrial scheduling conferences. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). If federal judges
had enthusiastically implemented this rule as the Conference intended, the Civil Re-
form Act might not have been passed. Notwithstanding the mandatory language of
rule 16(b), many federal district judges feel that early scheduling conferences are a
waste of time. Several members of the Judicial Conference supported the passage of
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agreement continues.' 2 In a study by Magistrate Judge Wayne D. Brazil,
a majority of lawyers felt that they did not receive "adequate and effi-
cient help from the courts in resolving discovery disputes and
problems."' °3 The group expressing this dissatisfaction include ninety
percent of the lawyers who handled larger, more complex cases. '°4 In
comparison, only about half of the attorneys who handled smaller cases
or cases filed in state court fell into this dissatisfied group.' 5 Further-
more, "[a] large number of attorneys reported that many judges
respond[ed] to discovery conflicts with an air of undisguised condescen-
sion, impatience, or open hostility."' 6 When judges did address discovery
conflicts, lawyers described the handling as naive or incompetent.'
0 7
Moreover, in response to an open-ended question about problems in the
discovery process, the lawyers responded more often with criticisms re-
garding the role of courts than to any other problem (71%).'0
The courts have acknowledged the difficulties inherent in electronic
document production and have tried to address the issue through a multi-
factored test designed to determine when to shift costs. Most notable is
Judge Shira A. Scheindlin's holding in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.
Judge Scheindlin wrote:
Although "the presumption is that the responding party must bear
the expense of complying with discovery requests" requests that
run afoul of the Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality test may subject the
requesting party to protective orders under Rule 26(c), "including
orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party's payment
16(b), but insisted that it require the judge to exercise direct control over the dis-
covery process, precluding local rules that permit magistrate control. This provision
remains the rule's intemal weakness.
Id.
102. See Beckerman, supra note 29, at 518.
It is well known that judges dislike discovery disputes and that some resent the time
that resolving them takes from other judicial activities. Not infrequently, judges ne-
glect lawsuits in which the lawyers are engaged in discovery battles, allowing them
to languish unattended on their dockets while the lawyers founder ever deeper into
non-cooperation, confrontation and impasse, a result also predictable by game theo-
rists.
Id.
103. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 862-63 (1980) [hereinafter Brazil 1].
104. Id. at 863.
105. Id.
106. Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers
About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 245 (1980) [hereinafter
Brazil 2].
107. Id. at 246.
108. Id. at n.47.
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of the costs of discovery." A court will order such a cost-shifting
protective order only upon motion of the responding party to a
discovery request, and "for good cause shown." Thus, the re-
sponding party has the burden of proof on a motion for cost-
shifting. 1°9
In determining whether cost-shifting was appropriate, Judge
Scheindlin considered seven factors, which were "designed to simplify
application of the Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality test in the context of
electronic data and to reinforce the traditional presumptive allocation of
costs."' The factors, which were very similar to those incorporated in
the advisory committee notes to the December 2006 amendments to
Rule 26(b)(2),"' are a commendable effort to provide some objective
factors by which judges can then subjectively determine cost-allocation
in a 26(b)(2) challenge. Numerous courts have followed Zubulake but
have, understandably, arrived at different divisions of cost depending on
109. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d
253 (1978) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).
110. Id.
111. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2), advisory committee's note, stating that appropriate
considerations may include:
I. the specificity of the discovery request;
2. the quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed
sources;
3. the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed
but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources;
4. the likelihood of finding relevant, response information that cannot be ob-
tained from other, more easily accessed sources;
5. predications as to the importance and usefulness of the further information;
6. the importance of the issues at stake in litigation; and
7. the parties' resources.
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their analysis of the factors.' And in some instances, courts have articu-
lated additional factors that influence the outcome."3
The parties can potentially manipulate any of these factors to their
advantage. For instance, the party claiming that the information re-
quested is inaccessible, such that the cost of production should be bome
by her opponent, has an incentive to inflate the alleged inaccessibility
and the cost estimate. By contrast, the requesting party has an incentive
to argue that the costs are low and the information is easily accessible.
The availability of the information from other sources is susceptible to
similar gamesmanship, as the description of the resources available to
each party will vary to suit the party's self-interest. The likelihood of
incorrect cost allocation-a division based on the party who most con-
vincingly argues their position as opposed to the actual position of the
parties-is extremely high. Despite the multiple factors, the rule is vague
and poses substantial enforcement challenges. It is yet another instance
where a judge or magistrate is not the best party to make an accurate
determination of cost allocation since it is difficult, if not impossible, to
verify the parties' arguments. This solution, which relies on a third-party
with imperfect information, is far less optimal than one in which the in-
centives of the parties are properly aligned to encourage cooperation in
the form of narrowly-directed, cost-effective discovery requests.
112. See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630 (Dist. Kan. Nov. 15, 2006) (decid-
ing that cost shifting was not justified); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
5, 2006) (granting defendants motion for cost shifting and requiring the plaintiff to pay 30%
of the costs for searching the backup tapes for one employee); Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v.
Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 FR.D. 594 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2004) (requiring the plaintiff to
modify its discovery request and the defendant to respond to the modified request before
further addressing the discovery issues); Multitechnology Serv., L.P v. Verizon Sw., No. 4:02-
cv-702-Y, 2004 WL 1553480, at *2, (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (dividing the expenses evenly
between the two parties "because it balances the benefit of the discovery for MTS and
provides Verizon with incentive to manage the costs it incurs in answering MTS' interrogato-
ries").
113. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572-73 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9,
2004). The court noted that:
We agree with both the Rowe court and the Zubulake court that the marginal utility
test is the most important factor. Furthermore, while we are guided by the remain-
der of the Rowe and Zubulake factors, we find that the proportionality test set forth
in Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) must shape the test. Thus, we modify the Zubulake rules by
adding a factor that considers the importance of the requested discovery in resolv-
ing the issues of the litigation.
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2. Judicial Intervention
Despite the latitude offered by the FRCP, resorting to judicial inter-
vention in discovery matters does not effectively discourage or cure
discovery abuse. Judicial intervention... is an inefficient solution because
the judicial system is already overburdened. But primarily, judicial dis-
cretion is a poor substitute for the ex-ante intent of the parties who
possess more information about the relevance of the materials in dispute
than the judge. Secondarily, discretion varies from judge to judge and
district to district, which makes it difficult for parties to assess the risks
associated with discovery motions and practices. Consequently, parties
often fail to avail themselves of the courts when confronted with abusive
discovery tactics from their adversaries.
Despite a long and robust record of the bar encouraging the courts to
regulate discovery, problems continue to abound. Trial courts are overex-
tended and understaffed."' District court dockets are more overburdened
than ever." 6 Between 1997 and 2006, U.S. district courts experienced an
11% increase in the number of pending cases." 7 Consequently, judges
have less time to manage discovery issues. In contrast to the actual liti-
gation, where a significant percentage of the parties' time is spent on
document discovery, as opposed to trial or settlement negotiations,"'
114. In this Article, I refer to judges as a source of third-party intervention. The argu-
ments are the same whether the judicial arbiter is a district court judge, magistrate judge, or
special master.
115. Beckerman, supra note 29, at 565 (discussing three main reasons as to why judges
have not heeded the consistent cry for more judicial management in the discovery process,
including "limited judicial resources, in terms of both the number of judicial officers and
competing demands on their time").
116. National Center for State Courts, Caseload Highlights, http://www.ncsconline.org/
D_Research/csp/Highlights/vol I no l.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
117. Judicial Caseload Indicators, http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2006/front/
mar06indicators.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
118. James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REv. 613, 637 (1998).
In Table 2.2 we present information on how lawyers spend their work hours on gen-
eral civil cases that close at least 270 days after filing. The average lawyer work
hours per litigant is 232 hours, of which an average of 36%, or 83 hours, is spent on
discovery, including discovery motions.... [W]e saw that the median percentage
discovery hours of total lawyer work hours is 25%. So, whether we consider aver-
age or median percentages, discovery is about one-fourth to one-third of total
lawyer work hours per litigant. Discovery accounted for less than half the lawyer
work hours in all the subsets of general civil cases that we examined.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Sandra Serkes, Mini-Coding Yields Quick and
Cost-Effective Document Control, 25 No. 5 OF COUNSEL 11 (2006), available at http://
www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G I - 145778833/mini-coding-yields-quick.html ("Accord-
ing to a report issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (October 1999),
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judges "dedicate only five percent of case-related time" to addressing
discovery issues." 9
While resource constraints may reduce the efficacy of judicial man-
agement as a solution, information asymmetries present even greater
challenges to judges attempting to resolve discovery disputes. 2 0 Because
judges are not privy to the glut of information shared between the par-
ties, judges are even less equipped to identify instances of discovery
abuse than are the litigating parties. Accordingly, it is difficult, if not im-
possible, for judges to address the problem of discovery abuse ex-ante. A
judge is more likely to rule erroneously on a motion to compel discovery
or a motion for a protective order because the relevance of a particular
request or document "might not be obvious to adversaries or to [the]
court.' 2' As Judge Easterbrook writes, it is impossible to tell "a dry hole
(common in litigation as well as in the oil business) from a request that
was not justified at the time.' ' 22 As a result, judges may consciously defer
to attorneys and "assum[e] these attorneys will know what information
they need and will aggressively seek this information."'1
23
The information asymmetries are not eliminated after a party re-
sponds to a request. If a legitimate request yields nothing, or if an
intentionally abusive request happens to strike gold (after all, even a bro-
ken clock is right twice a day), the courts, when dealing with these
issues ex-post, have to infer the intent of the parties (an inaccurate sci-
ence at best). Additionally, a party seeking the court's aid must invest
significant resources when presenting her case. As one commentator has
written "[i]f the responding party were to produce fully the information
sought and display it to the judge, the responding party would already
have incurred all the costs that [she] was trying to avoid."' 24 As a result, a
document discovery represents more than one-half the total cost of an average lawsuit and can
take up to 90 percent of the time that attorneys spend on a case during the active discovery
phase.").
119. Beckerman, supra note 29, at 566.
120. Robert J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 518 (1994) ("Discovery
disputes in contentious cases reveal the severity of these problems. If one party claims that the
other party has breached an agreement by engaging in abusive discovery practices a judge
often faces substantial evidentiary difficulties. Typically, the judge knows little about the in-
formation available to either the responding or requesting party.").
121. Beckerman, supra note 29, at 541.
122. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 639.
123. Greg M. Zipes, Discovery Abuse in the Civil Adversary System: Looking to Bank-
ruptcy's Regime of Mandatory Disclosure and Third Party Control over the Discovery Process
for Solutions, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1107, 1122-23 (1996-97).
124. John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nu-
clear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 569, 593 (1989).
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self-regulatory regime is better than one requiring a third-party to evalu-
ate whether a request was abusive or made in bad faith.
3. Sanctions Distort Incentives
The destruction or inadequate production of ESI has been outcome
determinative in several recent high-profile cases,' and many companies
are reflecting the unique challenges of ESI in their record storage and
production polices. In Zubulake, Judge Scheindlin imposed sanctions on
the defendant for willful spoliation.' Specifically, she gave adverse in-
ference instructions as to lost and deleted email and imposed significant
costs on the defendant.'27 The plaintiff ultimately prevailed to the tune of
a $29.2 million damages award. Morgan Stanley fared far worse after its
case ended in an approximately $1.5 billion verdict. The judge gave the
jury adverse inference instructions after she found that Morgan Stanley
had failed to disclose the existence of or adequately review ESI.'2' Addi-
tionally, the court revoked the pro hac vice admission of Morgan
Stanley's counsel.' 29
The stakes have been raised by awards like these. The risk to clients
and attorneys of failing to properly preserve, collect, review, or produce
ESI can be astronomical. Consequently, clients now have an incentive to
retain, collect, review, and ultimately turn over much larger amounts of
data. Accordingly, the sanctions have distorted the incentives of the par-
ties for efficient, narrow responses to responses approaching an
avalanche of information produced to protect the client from sanctions.
This misalignment of incentives is contrary to the interests of all in-
volved-requester, responder, and judge.
125. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I1), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005
WL 679071 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005).
126. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I11), 229 ER.D. 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
127. Id. at 437-40.
128. Colman (Parent) Holdings Inc. v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005
WL 674885, at *9-10 (Fl. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005). The Florida appellate court subsequently
reversed the $1.5 billion judgment, and the Supreme Court of Florida declined to review that
reversal. In re Morgan Stanley Derivative Litigation, 542 F. Supp. 2d 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y
2008) (citing Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc., 955 So.2d 1124
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.,
No. SC07-1251, 2007 WL 4336316 (Fla. Dec. 12, 2007)).
129. See id. at *10.
Corporate Cooperation Through Cost-Sharing
B. Meet-and-Confer Will Not Lead to Cooperation
The unique and complex nature of electronic information indicates a
need for a significant paradigm shift in the way litigants approach dis-
covery. As one commentator has written:
The first defect in the [discovery] process is that the cooperative
ethos of discovery clashes directly and irreconcilably with the
oppositional character and partisan norms of all other phases and
attributes of adversarial litigation. If the parties had been capable
of cooperation, chances are they would not have come (or con-
tinued) to litigate in the first place.3°
Although cooperation may not be the natural default for litigants in an
adversarial process, the need for cooperation among the parties has been
recognized by scholars, judges, and lawyers alike.'3' For instance, the
Sedona Conference, a leading authority on electronic discovery prac-
tices, has unanimously concluded that "dialogue between and among
litigants [is] a prerequisite to resolving (or avoiding) potentially costly
and disruptive electronic discovery disputes."'32 With modem discovery,
in addition to defining the scope of discoverable material, the parties also
must agree upon the manner in which that material will be searched
(such as sampling, keyword searching, etc.) and the form in which it will
be produced. In accordance with the FRCP 1 "rule of reasonableness,"
130. Beckerman, supra note 29, at 517.
131. THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at v. See also AD Hoc COMMITTEE FOR
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE,
DEFAULT STANDARD FOR DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS (2007), http:II
ww.ded.uscourts.gov/SLR/Misc/EDiscov.pdf ("E-discovery liaison. In order to promote
communication and cooperation between the parties, each party to a case shall designate an e-
discovery liaison through which all e-discovery requests and responses shall be made.');
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION 1, 2-3 (2006), http://ww.ncsconline.org/
mages/DiscCCJGuideinesFinal.pdf. See also Brownstone, supra note 3, 5 ("Judges have been
increasingly focused on developing a growing body of e-[d]iscovery case law, which will
ultimately propound a tried and true process. To be efficient and effective, that process must
mandate and enforce cooperation among the litigants as to search terms and other selection
criteria needed to narrow down huge data sets into manageable subsets."); George L. Paul &
Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10,
27 (2007), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl3i3/article10.pdf.
Quite simply, as courts and commentators have increasingly come to expressly recog-
nize, the volume and complexity of electronically stored information demand new forms of
collaboration. In turn, in many such instances, a tipping point can be said to have been reached
where the game theoretical aspects of litigation practice, dictating what is in one's self-
interest, have necessarily changed. Without greater cooperation among adversaries, parties are
doomed to any number of defeating consequences, not the least of which will be a real or
perceived information 'gap' in ferreting out evidence. Id.
132. THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at v.
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which states that courts should interpret and apply the rules "to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,' 3  dis-
covery should be used as a tool in furthering dispute resolution and not
as "a strategic weapon to coerce unjust, delayed, or expensive results.' 34
The December 2006 amendments to FRCP 26 recognize a need for
cooperation between the litigants. FRCP 26(f) requires the parties to
conduct an early "meet-and-confer" conference that addresses discovery
issues: 131
In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and basis of
their claims ... and the possibilities for promptly settling or re-
solving the case; make or arrange for the disclosures required by
Rule 26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving discoverable
information; and develop a proposed discovery plan. 36
Cooperation has the potential to greatly reduce the costs both parties
incur from discovery. Despite the obvious wish for cooperation ex-
pressed in the rules, the question remains, how do we get the parties to
cooperate? Assuming that litigants will actually cooperate as part of the
meet-and-confer conference presupposes a shift in attitudes based solely
on the requirement that the parties share more information with one an-
other. This method of achieving cooperation does not address the most
fundamental manner in which corporate managers decide upon strategic
actions: risk versus reward. The augmented meet-and-confer obligation
changes neither risk nor reward.
The current risks and associated penalties are inconsistent, inade-
quate, and incomplete ways of handling the problem. Currently, if the
two parties cannot come to a mutual agreement to constrain the scope
and volume of discovery, abuse will continue to be a cost-efficient and
even lucrative choice for litigants. 137 Simply put, the incentives of the
game have not been altered; hence, the meet-and-confer requirement will
simply play out as the rest of the game does. The incentives must be
transformed in order for the parties to cooperate during these sessions.
The best way to meet the goals of reasonableness espoused in FRCP I is
to overhaul the underlying incentives of the rules governing discovery to
make way for rules that support cooperation as a favorable strategy as
133. FED. R. Civ. P 1.
134. THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at v.
135. See FED. R. Ov. P. 26(f)(3) (requiring the parties to address "any issues about dis-
closure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which
it should be produced").
136. FED. R. Civ. P 26(0.
137. Cooter & Rubinfeld, Economic Model, supra note 22, at 452.
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opposed to a strategy of abuse. This is also the best way to ensure that
the meet-and-confer conference yields cooperative as opposed to merely
perfunctory attendance. In other words, cooperation between the parties
is crucial to lessening the costs of discovery, narrowing the focus of re-
quests and responses to more accurately mirror the substantive legal
issues in dispute, and reducing the burdens on the judiciary.
C. Status Quo Bias
The cost allocation rules function as default discovery rules. In other
words, parties may contract around the rules and agree to apportion costs
in a manner that is more aligned with their incentives. An extensive lit-
erature exists on default rules and how effectively they guide private
conduct.' Several of the underlying principles of default rules persua-
sively account for why corporate litigants have not bargained around the
current rule of responder-pay-all to establish a rule that better accounts
for the benefits received by the requesting party.
An acknowledged drawback is that it is often difficult for a party to
suggest a departure from that rule because the counterparty will suspect
the suggestion to be a "trick."'139 In other words, the counterparty per-
ceives the proposing party as attempting to secure an advantage at its
(the counterparty's) expense. Distrust is highly probable during discov-
ery so the parties may be very reluctant to suggest or accept an
agreement that deviates from the default cost allocation rules.' 4° On the
flip side, Professor Bernstein suggests that parties may avoid proposing
an alternative to a default rule due to the possibility that the counterparty
will draw an adverse inference based on the suggested deviation. 14 Fi-
nally, as Professors Ben-Shahar and Pottow suggest, parties may
determine that the efficiencies gained through suggesting a deviation
from the default rule are offset by the risk of exploitation that stems from
the "revelation of valuable private information."'
42
138. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 650, 652 (2006); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608 (1998); Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and
Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993).
139. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 138, at 652.
140. Id. at 665.
141. Id. at 656 (citing Bernstein, supra note 138). See also Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete
Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992). Spier uses the example of an athlete
who avoids proposing an injury clause during negotiations for fear that the team may infer that
he is injury prone as a consequence. Id. at 433.
142. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 138, at 657 (citing Spier, supra note 141).
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This tendency is sometimes referred to as "status quo bias.' 43 The
inclination is to abide by a default rule even when a deviation, such as an
equal division of discovery costs, is favorable to both parties.'" Status
quo bias helps to explain why corporate litigants have not arrived at the
cost sharing solution through pre-trial bargaining. The adversarial nature
of litigation, often characterized as distrustful, exacerbates the potential
that a negative inference would be drawn from such a proposal and that
the proposal will likely reveal some amount of private information. The
ingrained practice of following the responder-pay-all rule makes it even
more difficult for parties to suggest efficient alternatives to the current
strategically misaligned regime. 
45
III. RESTRUCTURING THE DISCOVERY GAME:
PROMOTING COOPERATION
Any alterations to the discovery rules should modify the incentive
structure to achieve an effective ex-ante solution that does not require a
third-party, such as a judge, to apply the rule. Private self-regulation
would provide better outcomes than third party monitoring 4 6 or what the
rules currently allow. The current regime fails to properly align the par-
ties' incentives to encourage self-regulating cooperation and, therefore,
does not lend itself to cost-reducing discovery practices. The goal of this
143. See Korobkin, supra note 138.
144. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 138, at 651.
145. Id. at 653 (arguing that a default rule may be more "sticky" in situations "where the
background rules and templates are well entrenched and commonly employed.").
146. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 120, at 518-19.
This problem also suggests why a judge may be no more able to ensure cooperation
by enforcing general rules of procedure than by enforcing a general contract be-
tween the parties. A vague or nonspecific rule that requires litigators to "conduct a
lawsuit cooperatively" or "to disclose voluntarily all material information" is easy
to write, but poses potentially severe enforcement difficulties. In our game, for ex-
ample, if the judge could identify defection, then the judge could punish defection
severely enough so as to deter it from ever occurring. Relying on the judge, the par-
ties could then avoid the prisoners' dilemma. Unfortunately, breaches of general
rules of procedure--e.g., "do not engage in burdensome discovery"-are no easier
to verify than are breaches of contract of similar specificity. In other words, a judge
may have grave difficulty verifying defection even when both parties know it has
occurred.
Id. The other benefits of discovery, such as more efficient enforcement of legal rles are be-
yond the scope of this Article. For more on these benefits, see Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desir-
ability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567, 594 (1989).
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Article, therefore, is to provide corporate parties engaged in civil litiga-
tion with better incentives for an ex-ante solution.
This section first analyzes the nature of discovery abuse. Next, it in-
troduces the prisoners' dilemma game and subsequently uses the game to
model and analyze the current problems of discovery. It then develops a
more effective solution that transforms the choices of the parties through
structural changes which provide the proper incentives for cooperation
among the litigants by implementing a discovery cost-sharing rule.'
4 7
A. Discovery Abuse
A party will issue a discovery request whenever the increase in the
expected value of the suit tied to the request exceeds the costs of making
the request. 4 1 Scholars have divided the incentives behind these requests
into two broad groups, "informational benefits" and "impositional bene-
fits.' ' 149 An "informational benefit" occurs when the requesting party
obtains information directly related to the strength or weakness of its
claims, i.e., its legal entitlement. For instance, a plaintiff may believe
that the value of her case is $1,000. She anticipates that a discovery re-
quest which costs $100 to prepare and execute will increase the
probability of prevailing from 50 percent to 75 percent, an increase of
$250, with a net payoff of $150.'' The request is therefore both cost-
effective and directly connected to her legal entitlement.
147. NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 33 (2nd
ed. 2006) ("[O]ne must understand that a change in the law will alter the incentive structure
confronting individuals and groups in society. This change in incentives will alter behavior,
and that new behavior will ultimately and systematically affect economic performance.").
148. Cooter & Rubinfeld, Reforming, supra note 12, at 65.
149. Setear, supra note 124, at 581-84; Cooter & Rubinfeld, Economic Model, supra
note 22, at 453 ("[Rlequests for facts whose expected value to the requesting party is less than
the transaction cost of producing them ... can be called 'informational abuse.' In contrast,
'impositional abuse' is a request for facts in order to impose compliance costs on the other
party.").
150. Setear, supra note 124, at 581-82.
Informational benefits' are benefits that the requesting party expects to gain from
the information that she receives from the responding party. Factual statements
from the responding party can increase the requesting party's ability to hone the le-
gal basis for her case, or help her estimate the value of the stakes in the case and her
chances of prevailing on the merits.
Id.
151. Here plaintiff starts with a 50% chance of winning $1,000, so her predicted value of
going to trial is $500. To increase her chance of winning to 75% she must spend $100. This
means that her net return is the predicted value of the verdict ($1000 * .75 = $750) minus the
cost of the discovery request ($100). Thus, her net return of filing the discovery request is
$150 ($750 - $100 -$500).
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Alternatively, a requesting party may benefit from a request by im-
posing costs on the responding party. This "impositional benefit" is one
"that the requesting party expects to gain because her request imposes
costs" on the responding party.'52 This can increase the overall cost of
litigation, thereby devaluing the responding party's settlement position.'53
For instance, a plaintiff may prepare and execute a $100 discovery re-
quest that will impose a $500 cost on the defendant although it will not
improve her probability of prevailing on the merits; in other words, it has
no connection to the strength of the legal claims she has asserted. As a
result, the plaintiff anticipates that the defendant will be willing to settle
for some amount lower than $500 (the cost to the defendant of respond-
ing) plus the expected value of her anticipated loss.'14 As long as that
increase is greater than the $100 the plaintiff spent formulating and issu-
ing the request, it is cost-effective even though it is not connected to the
validity of her legal claims. Accordingly, an impositional request may be
"justified by the costs it imposes on one's adversary rather than by gains
152. Setear, supra note 124, at 582.
153. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 636-37; see also Setear, supra note 124, at 582-83.
[S]uppose that the defendant repeats the $700,000 offer and also surprises you with
a discovery request that you estimate will cost you another $150,000 in legal fees
incurred in responding to the statement. (Assume you also believe that seeking a
protective order against the request would be fruitless.) You should rationally cave
in with respect to the case as a whole, and accept your opponent's settlement offer.
Going to trial, after all, will net you only $650,000-the cool million from the
verdict minus the $200,000 in fees that you originally expected and the additional
$150,000 in fees from responding to the discovery request. From your opponent's
point of view, her discovery request has impositional benefits, because that request
has forced you to accept a lower settlement offer than you would have accepted in
the absence of the impositional request.
Id.; see also Cooter & Rubinfeld, Reforming, supra note 12, at 74.
A settlement will correspond to the expected trial judgment when the costs of re-
solving the dispute-commonly called transaction costs-are equal for the two parties.
Conversely, asymmetrical transaction costs distort the terms of settlement so that
they do not correspond to the expected trial judgment. For example, if the plaintiff
faces lower trial costs than the defendant, the plaintiff can demand more than the
expected judgment to settle the case. Similarly, if the plaintiff faces lower discovery
costs than the defendant, the plaintiff can demand more than the expected judgment
to settle the case before discovery commences. Conversely, if the defendant faces
lower discovery and trial costs than the plaintiff, the defendant can insist on settling
for less than the expected judgment.
Id.; see also Cooter & Rubinfeld, Economic Model, supra note 22, at 437 ("[A]symmetrical
transaction costs distort the terms of settlement so that they do not correspond to the expected
trial judgment. For example, if the plaintiff faces lower trial costs than the defendant, then the
plaintiff can demand more than the expected judgment to settle the case.").
154. Her anticipated loss is her assessment of her risk which is her predicted probability
of losing multiplied by her assessment of the liability involved.
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to the requester derived from the contribution the information will make
to the accuracy of the judicial process. '"55
Thus, a requesting party can, broadly speaking, issue two categories
of discovery requests: those directly related to their legal entitlements
and those that are not. 1 6 While one category is clearly abusive and the
other more readily comports with the aims of fairness and expediency
intended by the FRCP,'57 both categories may impose a significant and
material burden on the responding party. Although both may include a
burdensome response, both are not automatically abusive. If the burden
is the purpose of the request, the request can be categorized as abusive. If
the burden, however, is a mere byproduct of a request related to the re-
quester's legal entitlement, the request is non-abusive. Put another way, a
request intentionally calculated to produce a benefit not related to the
requesting party's legal entitlements can be described as abusive. On the
other hand, a request intended to produce a benefit related to the request-
ing party's legal entitlements can be described as non-abusive.
Requests, however, are rarely susceptible to stark, binary categoriza-
tions. Consequently, labels of "non-abusive" and "abusive" more closely
resemble the opposing end points of an "abuse" continuum than exclu-
sive divisions of discovery practices. A discovery request may have a
legitimate connection to the requesting party's legal entitlements; how-
ever, that connection may be so tenuous or the expected gain so slight
that the requesting party's primary motivation in issuing the request is to
obtain a benefit unrelated to her legal entitlement.' For instance, the
above-mentioned $100 discovery request may increase the plaintiff's
probability of winning the $1,000 judgment from 50% to 55%, which
represents a loss to the plaintiff of $50.9 A rational plaintiff will not
155. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 637-38.
156. Setear, supra note 124, at 581-82.
157. See supra Part H.A. 1.
158. Some scholars have classified this as discovery misuse, which is separate than
abuse. Cooter & Rubinfeld, Economic Model, supra note 22, at 450. The authors note:
We want to define discovery misuse and abuse in a way that clarifies current law
and practice. From this perspective, misuse or abuse occurs when the gain to the re-
questing party is out of proportion relative to the cost of compliance. In general, we
can define discovery misuse as discovery whose compliance costs more than the
expected increase in value to the requesting party's claim. Discovery misuse is de-
fined as knowing misuse.
Id.; see also Cooper, supra note 23, at 466.
159. Here plaintiff starts with a 50% chance of winning $1,000, so her predicted value of
going to trial is $500. To increase her chance of winning to 55% she must spend $100. This
means that her net return is the predicted value of the verdict ($1000 * .55 = $550) minus the
cost of the discovery request ($100). Thus, she suffers a net loss of $50 by filing the discovery
request ($550- $100 -$500).
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make this request unless there is a benefit, such as one that comes from
imposing costs on her opponent. If that benefit is greater than $50, the
proposition is justified as cost-efficient. While this request may still be
an impositional request, it comports with the positive qualities associated
with non-abusive requests.
As impositional costs can be a component of any discovery request,
it is difficult to detect whether abuse has occurred. Accordingly, the
bright-line definition of a non-abusive request is not a sufficient criterion
for reducing burdensome effects on the responding party. To a respond-
ing party, the burden of responding in either case can be high.' 6° Hence,
this overlapping element in abusive and non-abusive requests makes
them difficult to distinguish. Likewise, as long as costs are imposed, the
requesting party receives the same settlement benefit from either type of
request.' 61 The standard of abuse is thus a subjective standard because it
is the requesting party's valuation of the expected benefit from the re-
quest that determines whether or not it is truly abusive. Additionally,
despite good-faith on the part of the requesting party, the responding
party may still suffer an abusive effect due to the burden imposed on it.
From the requesting party's point of view, it follows that the difference
in the substantive content of the request is immaterial because the impo-
sitional consequence of each request, regardless of abusive intent, is
identical. As such, the benefits that flow from these impositional conse-
quences, as much as the information necessary to determine the merits of
a case, drive whether a discovery request is issued. The burden to the
responding party places no constraint on the content of the requesting
party's demand, and the more burdensome the request, the greater the
benefit to the requesting party.1
62
Consequently, the current rules governing discovery practice not
only fail to identify and curtail discovery abuse but actually lead a ra-
tional actor to select abuse over cooperation. The current rules promote
abuse since the requesting party who receives the benefit incurs none of
the costs the receiving party incurs in responding. This incentive struc-
160. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 638.
From the perspective of the producing party, normal and impositional requests are
hard to distinguish-and for the producing party's purposes the difference is imma-
terial, because they have identical effects. So both categories may be effectively
impositional (that is, they may yield an increase in the settlement offer out of pro-
portion to the value of the information in improving accuracy).
Id.
161. Id.
162. See discussion supra Part I.A.3 (concluding that sanctions and similar measures
are not effective in disciplining the behavior of corporate parties engaged in discovery).
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ture produces optimal conditions for abuse.'63 A rational actor maximizes
her potential benefit by disadvantaging her opponent as much as possi-
ble. When a request is issued, any costs that are borne by the respondent
translate into some level of benefit for the issuer. As a result, the most
efficient request, strictly from the requester's point of view, is one that
maximizes the costs imposed on an opponent. In the instance where an
actor chooses to act cooperatively instead of abusively, the actor is in
fact worse off if her opponent chooses to respond abusively because she
will have revealed private information about the strength or weakness of
her case. Her opponent, on the other hand, will have received both the
benefit of the private information and the benefit that comes from an
abusive response. This structure, where a party is able to benefit while
imposing costs on her opponent but would in fact be better off cooperat-
ing, results in the classic prisoners' dilemma.'64
B. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Discovery Cost-Sharing
Game theory consists of analytical tools that illustrate strategic inter-
actions in the decision-making process."' Two of the underlying
assumptions of game theory are that the decision-makers are rational and
that they "reason strategically."166 In other words, they work toward a well-
defined observable purpose and when making decisions, they consider
what they know or expect about the other party's behavior.1 6 ' By illustrat-
ing the strategic variables and outcomes that influence the players in a
particular situation, game theory sheds light on the players' interactions.
The tabular representations often used to illustrate normal form games are
useful for categorizing the choices and confirming the underlying intui-
tions of particular interactions. In the context of document discovery, a
game-theoretic lens reveals the motivations informing the parties' choices
when formulating and responding to discovery requests.
163. Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J.
352, 357 (1982) [hereinafter Discovery Abuse].
164. See infra notes 182-190 and accompanying text; see also Discovery Abuse, supra
note 163, at 362-64.
165. MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAmE THEORY I (MIT
Press) (1994). To be sure, game theory, and more specifically, the prisoners' dilemma, is an
imperfect model for the behaviors and reasoning in the discovery process. While imperfect,
others such as Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, have used "the prisoners' dilemma as
a heuristic to understand better the circumstances of disputes locked in a legal conflict in an
abstract world in which there are no lawyers-only the parties themselves and a judge." Gil-
son & Mnookin, supra note 120, at 512.
166. OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 165, at 1.
167. Id.
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This section first describes the prisoners' dilemma game, then argues
that discovery shares the general overarching structure of the prisoners'
dilemma, and, finally, it analyzes how the dilemma is eliminated through
structural changes to the cost obligations of each party. It effectively
reveals that once the parties' incentives are structurally altered, by chang-
ing the distribution of costs in document discovery, parties will be more
willing to cooperate because cooperation is aligned with their self-interest.
This supports the intuition that if one rule in discovery is changed, the re-
sult will alter the behaviors of the parties. 168 As the parties' preferences and
subsequent decisions will be to cooperate with their opponent, both sides
will have lower costs and a more efficient process, thereby aligning the
parties' choices with the purported meta-goal of FRCP 1.169
1. The Prisoners' Dilemma
The prisoners' dilemma is a normal form game,17 in which the two
players ("prisoners") may make one of two "moves." They may either
"cooperate" with or "defect" from the other. Like other models of strate-
gic behavior, each player is only concerned with maximizing her own
payoff and is indifferent to the payoff of the other player. In the language
of the prisoners' dilemma, the exclusive goal of each prisoner is to spend
as little time in prison as possible, and "each is indifferent to how much
time the other spends in prison.''
The term "prisoners' dilemma" is derived from a tale involving two
prisoners.' 72 Both prisoners have been arrested and are in police custody
for committing a serious crime with a maximum sentence of twelve
years of imprisonment. In order for the State to successfully prosecute
the alleged crime, it needs a confession from at least one of the prison-
ers. If neither prisoner confesses, however, the State has enough
evidence to prosecute and convict both for a lesser offense, which carries
168. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 245 (1994).
A change in rules may alter not only the costs that each party bears but also when
during the course of the litigation each cost must be incurred. Both kinds of
changes can have powerful effects on the dynamics of litigation . . . Altering the se-
quence or the number of moves in a game has a dramatic effect on the likely course
of play. Hence, the effects of even small changes in the rules of civil procedure are
often significant.
Id.
169. See discussion supra Part II.B.
170. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 168, at 6-49.
171. Id. at 33.
172. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 120, at 514 n.15 ("The game, with its characteristic
payoff structure, was devised in 1950 by two RAND researchers, Merrill Flood and Melvin
Dresher.") (citations omitted).
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a lighter five-year sentence. To secure their cooperation, the police offer
each prisoner a deal. Either prisoner may betray the other and confess,
thereby receiving a suspended sentence in exchange for cooperating. Al-
ternatively, they can reject the deal and remain silent. If Prisoner A
chooses to remain silent, and Prisoner B confesses, Prisoner A will be
convicted of the more serious crime and receive the maximum twelve
year sentence. If Prisoner A confesses, and Prisoner B does not, Prisoner
A will go free. In the event that both prisoners confess, the state will be
able to successfully try them for the more serious crime, but will seek a
lenient seven-year sentence in exchange for their cooperation.
Each prisoner is held in a separate room so as to prevent contact with
the other prisoner and, therefore, no means of communication or collabo-
ration.13 Thus, each prisoner is faced with a dilemma: should she defect
and betray the other prisoner or should she remain silent? Each prisoner's
jail sentence is dependent on what the other prisoner decides. However,
each prisoner must make her decision without knowing the other's choice.
The game and the possible payoffs are modeled in the payoff matrix be-
low. This tabular representation illustrates the payoffs and strategies of the
two prisoners in the game. 174 It does not describe the players' decision-
making process or underlying reasoning, but simply shows the numerical
value associated with each strategy: cooperate or defect.'75 A payoff matrix
for a two-player game lists the strategies for one player in the rows (Pris-
oner A) and for the other in the columns (Prisoner B).176 In the cells where
the two strategies intersect, the first number is the row player's payoff, and
the second number is the column player's payoff."'
PAYOFF MATRIX
Prisoner B
Cooperate Defect
Prisoner A Cooperate
Defect
(5),(5) (12)/(0)
(0)/(12) (7)/(7)
In the event that Prisoner B betrays Prisoner A and confesses,
Prisoner A is better off confessing as well. By doing so, she will receive
the seven-year sentence as opposed to the twelve-year sentence she would
receive if she remained silent. Similarly, if Prisoner A remains silent,
173. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 168, at 33.
174. Setear, supra note 124, at 571.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Prisoner B is still better off confessing because she will then go free rather
than suffering a five-year prison term. Regardless of Prisoner A's choice,
Prisoner B is better off confessing every time." As this is always the case,
all rational players will confess, making Confess-Confess the dominant
strategy.7 9 This strategy leaves both players worse off than if they had
cooperated with the other and both remained silent."80
2. The Discovery Dilemma 8'
The two parties to a lawsuit face choices that are similar to the pris-
oners' dilemma as part of the discovery process.'82 The assumptions and
rules of the game that framed the choices of the prisoners also apply to
the interactions between the two parties in discovery. As the prisoners'
only goal in sentencing was to minimize their time in jail without regard
to the other, each party in discovery is only interested in optimal self-
positioning and has no concern for the opposing party's position. Each
party (defendant or plaintiff) can choose to either abuse or cooperate in
making and responding to discovery requests."' The matrix below con-
tains the payoff structure of the potential combinations of abusive or
cooperative moves by the plaintiff and defendant. It illustrates why dis-
178. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 168, at 34.
179. "A dominant strategy is a best choice for a player for every possible choice by the
other player. One strategy is 'dominated by' another strategy when it is never better than that
strategy and is sometimes worse." Id. at 11. For further discussion on dominant strategies, see
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY __
(1989).
180. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 168, at 34.
181. Although discovery may have many rounds, parties generally do not know how
many rounds will be played and whether a round will be played after the current one. In other
words, at any point during discovery the controversy may end either due to the parties settling,
a successful summary judgment motion, or motion to dismiss. As such, each round is played
as a single round game. Additionally, as it is difficult to detect whether an opponent cooper-
ated or defected in a previous round, and to what degree, there is too much noise for it to be
modeled as a multi-round game.
182. Note that while the choices are similar they are not identical. See discussion supra
Part III.B. 1.
183. For a plaintiff cooperation means making a discovery request where the anticipated
value of the request to the plaintiff (VPR) is greater than the cost the plaintiff imposes on the
defendant (CD). Cooperation exists where VPR > CD; whereas abuse exists where VPR < CD.
This request is likely one that is narrowly tailored to the plaintiff's informational needs and
claims as opposed to an overly broad fishing expedition. The defendant can respond to re-
quests in a cooperative or abusive (retaliatory) manner. This means a defendant can either
engage in a variety of abusive practices such as refusing to turn over relevant information,
hiding that information in unlikely places in the documents they do turn over, and providing
the other side with far more information than is necessary to respond to the initial request,
thereby increasing the plaintiffs cost to uncover the relevant information. Conversely, the de-
fendant may respond cooperatively in a manner that provides the plaintiff with the information
requested in a useable and straightforward format.
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covery presents a situation analogous to the prisoners' dilemma for the
two parties involved. As the payoffs demonstrate, discovery is not a zero-
sum game, which means gains by one player do not necessarily result in
a loss to the other player.l As a result, the parties are able to reduce their
combined overall discovery expenditures through cooperation which
leaves them better off than if they abused one another.' With each side
limited to two moves (cooperate or abuse), there are four possible pay-
offs:
PAYOFF MATRIX
Plaintiff
Cooperate Defect
(3),(3) (6)/(1)
(1)/(6) (4)/(4)Defendant CooperateDefect
When both the plaintiff and the defendant cooperate, each side will
lose approximately $3 million. This assumes that both parties have re-
vealed some private information, but also gained some information from
the cooperative actions of their opponents. Additionally, each party has
expended resources to submit its request or response. Conversely, if the
two sides choose to defect, neither side readily reveals private informa-
tion. Each party has to expend greater effort than in a mutually
cooperative scenario to cull any discernable private information about
her opponent. Additionally, the requesting party (here, the plaintiff) will
have to expend additional effort to either sort through mountains of
unresponsive materials or to file a motion to compel'86 to force the re-
sponding party (here, the defendant) to produce any responsive
184. Setear, supra note 124, at 572.
185. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 120, at 516 ("Mutual cooperation involves lower
total litigation costs than mutual defection.").
186. Beckerman, supra note 29, at 525.
Lawyers endeavor to achieve this end in many ways including: propounding wide-
ranging, penetrating and comprehensive discovery requests; pursuing them if neces-
sary through motions to compel discovery; simultaneously asserting all possible
objections in response to adversaries' requests, including those of irrelevance,
excessive scope and undue burden; construing all of the opponents' requests nar-
rowly and excluding everything not directly responsive to them; asserting on the
client's behalf all available privileges as excuses for non-production of documents,
failure to answer interrogatories or instructions not to answer questions on deposi-
tions; and seeking protective orders to validate any decisions not to answer or
produce.
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information wrongly withheld. They each defect or abuse at a cost of $4
million. In the final two scenarios, one party cooperates while the other
abuses. This leaves the cooperative party in the most disadvantageous po-
sition. "In many disputes, because of the adversarial nature of litigation,
cooperative moves by one litigant, if not reciprocated by the other, can
lead to exploitation and something akin to a sucker's payoff."'87
The "sucker's payoff' describes an outcome in which the coopera-
tive party has revealed its private information whereas the abusing party
has not. Thus, the abusing party has benefited at the expense of the co-
operating party. Additionally, if the cooperating party is the requesting
party (here, the plaintiff), she must spend additional time, money, and
effort to either force the responding party (here, the defendant) to pro-
duce the remaining information or to cull through an over-inclusive
response. Thus, if the plaintiff cooperates and the defendant abuses, the
plaintiff loses $6 million, whereas the net loss to the defendant is only $1
million. Conversely, if the defendant is the cooperative party, the defen-
dant must expend significant effort to comply with an overly broad, low
expected-value request and/or file a protective order, and will gain little
insight into the plaintiff's case. In this scenario, the plaintiff learns a
great deal about the defendant's case, reveals very little of its own infor-
mation, and imposes tremendous cost on its opponent. Hence, the
defendant finds itself out $6 million compared to only $1 million for the
plaintiff.
One reason for this result is the asymmetry of private information.
Each side has information about its legal claims, defenses, and corre-
sponding information, but does not have reliable information regarding
its opponent's position. Both discovery requests and the corresponding
responses reveal private information to or conceal private information
from the previously uninformed opponent. The more narrow and coop-
erative a request, the more information will be revealed. For instance, a
plaintiff's cooperative request will reveal something about the strength
of its own case, including the claims for which it believes there is a
higher likelihood of prevailing and perhaps even litigation tactics. The
defendant can then use this to strengthen its defense, thereby reducing
the plaintiff's chance of victory and corresponding settlement value.
Conversely, a broader request may serve to distract a defendant from the
plaintiff's strongest claims by forcing a defendant to devote resources to
claims that are nothing more than red herrings. Additionally, such broad
requests may make it more difficult for a defendant to attribute a clear
strategy or thought process to its opponent.
187. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 120, at 516.
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The plaintiff is worse off when its discovery request is cooperative
and the defendant's response is abusive because the plaintiff will either
have less information or a more difficult time sorting through extensive
data to find buried relevant information. This results in additional costs
to the plaintiff: seeking a motion to compel, carrying out document re-
view, or sending additional requests. Similarly, if a defendant responds
to an abusive request in a cooperative manner, it has tipped its hand, re-
vealing private information and thereby increasing the plaintiff's chance
of prevailing.
As is the case in the prisoners' dilemma, neither party is able to ver-
ify whether its opponent has cooperated or abused until it's too late.""
The responding party's decision is uninformed by the requesting party's
decision because, at the time of the decision, the information on which
the requesting party's decision is made is private and thus unknown to
the responding party. Accordingly, the responding party will not know
whether the requesting party's request was cooperative or abusive.
Hence, each side must independently decide the best move for the given
situation.'" Neither side can obtain a binding commitment to cooperate
from its opponent. There is no coercive or cooperative mechanism by
which the responding party can control or influence the behavior of its
opponent; therefore, the best way for the responding party to guarantee
herself some benefit is to make an abusive response. Thus, each party in
the litigation discovery game has a dominant strategy of abuse. The
dominant strategy equilibrium for this game is then to Abuse-Abuse,
188. In discovery, unlike the Prisoners' Dilemma, the parties may be able to infer
whether their opponent has cooperated or abused based on the breadth of the request, the
amount of information withheld or produced, and/or the substance of the objections made.
Any inference however, may be inaccurate, as the basis upon which a request or a response
was made is unknown to the recipient of said request or response. While there are signals that
may indicate whether a move was abusive or cooperative, the signals are noisy at best. Addi-
tionally, even when a party is confident that the other side has abused, the available third-party
(i.e. judicial) remedies are limited, as judicial intervention is problematic at best. See supra
notes 101-124 and accompanying text; see also Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 120, at 517-
18 ("Even where a breach of [a cooperative discovery contract] is observable by the parties, a
violation may be difficult to verify to a judge, thus making enforcement problematic."). For
more on the distinction between observable and verifiable information, see BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 168, at 246.
189. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 120, at 517 ("The rules of the game for a prisoners'
dilemma also require that each player remains ignorant of what the other player will do before
making a move: enforceable commitments or contracts are not possible and thus the parties
cannot credibly bind themselves to cooperate."); see also BAIRD ET AL., supra note 168, at 32
("The game-theoretic problems involving simultaneous decisionmaking extend to a broader
class of cases, however. They include any situation in which players must act without knowing
what the other player has done.").
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despite the fact that this strategy will cost each side more money than if
there was mutual cooperation.'90
3. Discovery Cost-Sharing
Introducing an element to the game whereby each participant dimin-
ishes its own value through its own abusive action changes the dominant
strategy of the game. For example, if the prisoners in the prisoners' di-
lemma were forced to serve half of the combined sentence with the other
prisoner,'9' each prisoner would always prefer to keep silent and force the
state to prosecute it for the lesser crime. This scenario is always the most
favorable to the prisoners and maximizes their personal payoffs by
minimizing the amount of time they spend in jail. It connects Prisoner
A's payoff maximization to the jail sentence served by Prisoner B, elimi-
nating the classic dilemma and encouraging cooperative behavior.
Similarly, if discovery costs are shared equally (50/50 cost-sharing),
the plaintiff's best response, regardless of what the defendant does, is to
cooperate.9 2 The same is true for the defendant. As opposed to the pris-
oners' dilemma illustrated above, this change in the default rule creates a
new dominant strategy equilibrium of Cooperate-Cooperate, which is
illustrated in the new payoff matrix below.
PAYOFF MATRIX
Plaintiff
Cooperate Defect
Defendant Cooperate
Defect
(3),(3) (3.5)/(3.5)
(3.5)/(3.5) (4)/(4)
Like the prisoners' dilemma, in the event that both plaintiff and de-
fendant act cooperatively, each side will minimize discovery
expenditures, reduce the time for dispute resolution, and reveal the in-
formation necessary for each party to make a better and more accurate
assessment of the strength of its case. This division provides a more effi-
cient default rule for a large number of corporate litigants. Parties would
still be free to contract their own cost allocation rules; however, such a
default rule will situate most parties in a more economically optimal po-
190. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 120, at 516.
191. This is half of the sum of the sentences received by Prisoner A and Prisoner B.
192. The prisoners' dilemma is very useful for modeling the incentives of two equally
sized corporations engaged in litigation where there are symmetrical discovery requests and
responses. The obvious dominant strategy equilibrium of cooperate-cooperate becomes less
obvious as the size of the two parties diverge.
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sition than the current responder-pay-all rule. In a model that strictly
considers the cost 193 of discovery expenditures, it is possible to restruc-
ture litigants' incentives to encourage cost-lowering cooperation.
Reducing discovery abuse and increasing control over the cost of discov-
ery will allow corporate managers to better assess risks when making
litigation and settlement decisions.
CONCLUSION
Document discovery need not be a lose-lose proposition for litigants
and courts. Despite the transformation of document production following
the advent of ESI, it is nevertheless possible to reduce litigant burden
and the risk of sanctions engendered by discovery. The current discovery
rules require each party to bear the entire cost of its discovery response.
As shown through the application of the classic prisoners' dilemma, this
inefficient regime rewards abusive behavior and contributes to staggering
litigation costs. Even the recent federal discovery amendments, which
were intended to address the astounding cost of discovery, fail to alter
the underlying incentives that inform litigants' decisions.
By viewing the discovery dilemma through a game-theoretic lens,
this Article provides a novel answer to the problem of discovery abuse in
complex civil litigation between corporate entities. Instituting a 50/50
cost-allocation solution would realign the strategic incentives of the liti-
gants in a way that rewards cooperation and cost-minimizing decision-
making. This approach improves upon the status quo by better utilizing
the core motivations underlying the decisions of corporate managers in
litigation. It places the parties in a much better position if they choose
not to bargain away from the default rule, and potentially opens the door
for them to allocate costs in a manner that more accurately reflects the
benefits and burdens associated with discovery. When corporate parties
begin litigation by sharing the cost of discovery evenly, each side's self-
interest is tied to the overall cost of discovery. While still not mandating
cooperation, a cost-sharing approach would lead corporate parties to
conclude that the most cost-effective method of managing their discov-
ery costs is through non-abusive, narrowly-focused requests and
responses.
193. Costs here have been monetized but include more than strictly monetary values; it
is a measure of money, time, effort and overall change in the strength of that side's position.
See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 640.
Fall 20091
